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I examine some of the key scientific precommitments of modern psychology, and argue
that their adoption has the unintended consequence of rendering a purely psychological
analysis of mind indistinguishable from a purely biological treatment. And, because
these precommitments sanction an “authority of the biological,” explanation of phe-
nomena traditionally considered the purview of psychological analysis is fully sub-
sumed under the biological. I next evaluate the epistemic warrant of these precommit-
ments and suggest that there are good reasons to question their applicability to
psychological science. I conclude that experiential aspects of reality (reflected in mental
construct terms such as memory, belief, thought, and desire) give us reason to remain
open to the need for psychological explanation in the treatment of mind.
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In a letter to the APS Observer, Scott Lilien-
feld notes a trend among Departments of Psy-
chology to adopt a change of name. This de-
partmental rebranding consists in adding
“Brain” (or a cognate—e.g., Neuro) to “Psycho-
logical Science”:
Dartmouth’s Department of Psychology has become
the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences;
Indiana University’s department is similarly termed the
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences; and
Duke’s department now calls itself the Department of
Psychology and Neuroscience. These departments are
hardly alone; the University of Colorado at Boulder’s
psychology department has recently become the De-
partment of Psychology and Neuroscience, and the
University of Louisville’s department has become the
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences. (Lil-
ienfeld, 2011)
We participated in a similar makeover at
UCSB. Our program, since its inception, went
by the name “Department of Psychology.”
However, motivated by a perceived change in
circumstances (e.g., the President’s initiative to
map the human brain and funding agencies
growing appetite for proposals with a neurosci-
ence flavor), we decided a product rebranding
might be in order (perhaps “repurposing” better
captured our motivation for change). After
much, occasionally heated, debate we opted for
the name Department of Psychological and
Brain Sciences.
My reason for relating this little episode of
departmental history is not to argue—as did
Lilienfield—that the titular conjunction (i.e.,
“psychological” and “brain” sciences) might be
taken as a tacit endorsement of Cartesian dual-
ity. Departmental renaming, in my view, has
implications beyond the problem of dualism—
implications that call to question whether psy-
chology still has anything of substance to offer
to a science of the mind.
Goals of the Article
The currently popular view is that the mind can
be conceptualized as “a naturally selected system
of organs of computation” (Pinker, 2005, p. 22).
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Accompanying this are three corollaries – (a) a
bio-physical reduction of mind is (or soon will be)
within reach (e.g., Papineau, 2001),1 (b) the ap-
pearance of conscious free will is a trick played by
the mind (e.g., Wegner, 2003), and (c) “uncon-
scious processes can carry out every [emphasis
added] fundamental high–level function that con-
scious processes can perform” (Hassin, 2013, p.
195). Considered together, these propositions—
which are more in the nature of scientific precom-
mitments (clarification of this and other terms
used in the text is found in Table 1) than nomo-
logical necessities mandated by the data (see sec-
tion “Questioning the Precommitments”)—have
considerable influence on how we approach re-
search and theory in psychological science (e.g.,
Piccinini, 2006).
I argue that these propositions, when taken as
four premises of a deductive argument, lead to the
conclusion that biological mechanism is both a
necessary and sufficient explanation for human
behavior. Put differently, it no longer is clear what
work psychology has to offer current theories of
mind: A commitment to unconscious neural com-
putation and physical determinism sanctions a
purely biological treatment of phenomena tradi-
tionally considered the concern of psychological
analyses. In light of this, it would seem that the
departmental renaming process should be taken a
step further: The title should be simply “Brain
Sciences”—a rebranding likely to please elimina-
tive materialists, psycho-neural identity theorists,
and administrators (who will welcome an oppor-
tunity to prune departmental letterhead in these
cost-cutting times).
In the next section I discuss the role of physi-
calism (i.e., the mind is a biological computer
instantiated by a physical brain) and the other
precommitments coloring our understanding of
mind. In section “The Question: Is There Still
Room for Psychology in the Science of Mind?,” I
argue that these precommitments open the door to
a “science of mind” in which phenomena custom-
arily considered the concern of psychological sci-
ence are fully subsumable under biological expla-
nation (the “individuation problem”; section “Can
We Individuate Psychological From the Biologi-
cal Activities of the Brain?”). In the final two
sections I take issue with the premises outlined in
section “Precommitments: Physicalism, Deter-
minism, the Unconscious,” and contend that a
science of mind that neuters the causal and ex-
planatory efficacy of psychological explanation is
misguided.
Precommitments: Physicalism,
Determinism, the Unconscious
In this section I touch briefly on some of
the key precommitments that underwrite most
contemporary approaches to understanding
the mind (even a moderately satisfying treat-
ment of this very complex topic would require
volumes). These precommitments, though
functionally independent, when treated syllo-
gistically endorse a reconceptualization of
“Psychological and Brain Sciences” in which
the first predicate (i.e., psychological) is left
without a clear explanatory role. I refer to this
as “the authority of the biological” (see sec-
tion “The Question: Is There Still Room for
Psychology in the Science of Mind?”).
Physicalism and Neural Computation
The terms materialism and physicalism both
are used to refer to the doctrine that everything
that exists—whether molecule, mineral, or
mind—exists wholly as matter. Materialism,
whose roots trace to the atomists of Greek an-
tiquity, is the doctrine that all reality is consti-
tuted of solid, inert substances (i.e., material)
that interact energetically and deterministically
via physical contact (e.g., Crane & Mellor,
1990).
Developments in modern physics pose seri-
ous difficulties for some of the properties attrib-
uted to “matter” by traditional materialist doc-
trine. Discoveries (primarily in the last century)
suggest that matter need be neither inert nor
solid (think “fields of force”), and that objects
can interact instantaneously despite separation
by space-like intervals (an interval is space-like
if an object can be present at two events only if
it travels faster than the speed of light).
1 In my journal articles I typically cite a large number of
supporting documents—ranging from the mid-100s to more
than 300! In an effort to conserve journal space, I have been
asked to forgo my proclivity toward encyclopedic referenc-
ing. Accordingly, in all but one (very important) case I cite
only a single salient exemplar of the position under consid-
eration. However, lest the reader worry that this paucity of
documentation suggests an idealized review of the litera-
ture, I encourage those concerned (or simply interested) to
contact me via e-mail (see the Author’s Notes) and I will
supply additional bibliographic material.
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In what follows, I therefore adopt the term
“physicalism” when discussing the metaphysi-
cal doctrine that nature is limited to facts about
matter and its interactions. Physicalism holds
that all substances are identical with the type of
things studied by physicists (e.g., Spurrett &
Papineau, 1999). This includes physical partic-
ulars (e.g., subatomic particles), physical prop-
erties (e.g., mass) and the laws that govern them
(e.g., F  MA). A simpler way of putting the
physicalist doctrine is that everything that exists
either is an entity or is composed of entities
studied by physical science.2
Although physicalism encompasses all natu-
ral phenomena, my interests are more circum-
scribed—that is, the implications of physicalism
for the science of psychology. Physics deals
only in objective and quantifiable properties of
physical objects (e.g., size, shape, mass, and
motion). It has no place for qualitative aspects
of nature reflected in mental construct terms
such as belief, desire, pain, trust, happiness,
anger, joy (e.g., Wilson, 2006). To close this
metaphysical gap, physicalism stipulates that
2 Physics, of course, is an ever-evolving discipline (com-
pare present-day physical principles with those characteriz-
ing Newtonian mechanics). To avoid definitional slippage,
let’s stipulate that physicalism embraces not just our current
understanding of nature, but future discoveries as well.
Table 1
Glossary of Key Terms Not Defined in the Text
1. Consciousness. Consciousness comes in many kinds (e.g., sentience, access consciousness, noetic consciousness,
temporal consciousness, phenomenal consciousness; e.g., Klein, in press). My use of the term consists in the
proposition that X is conscious if and only if there is “something it is like” for the organism to be in that state (e.g.,
Nagel, 1974). That is, consciousness consists in first-person experience (see below). This usage is what most
philosophers have in mind when discussing phenomenal consciousness.
2. Epiphenomenon. X is an epiphenomenon if it occurs alongside or, in parallel to, a primary phenomenon, Y, but has
no causal relevance for the enactment of Y. An example would be smoke issuing from the operation of a steam
engine. Smoke (the epiphenomenon) occurs alongside the workings of the engine (the primary phenomenon), but has
no effect on the engine’s performance.
3. Experience. In my treatment, all experience is conscious: It is the qualitative aspect of the mental state (see below)
you are having right now. Some who use the term have in mind sensation (e.g., pain) and perception (e.g., that tree
over there). For me, experience also can be about internally generated content such as memories, thoughts and
images.
Throughout the text, I treat the term “experiential reality” as synonymous with terms qualitative, subjective, mental,
and psychological reality (in distinction from non-qualitative aspects of reality). Although I realize that it is not
technically precise to do so, it is an expositional convenience made necessary, in part, by the usage of quotes cited in
the text. I acknowledge the duality of my position.
4. Functional Independence. As used in this article, two (or more) presuppositions (e.g., determinism, physicalism) are
functionally independent if the positions endorsed by presupposition X are not entailed by the positions endorsed by
presupposition Y. This does not imply that X has nothing to do with Y, or that they are disjunctive (e.g., they can be
orthogonal); indeed, as argued in this article, functionally independent presuppositions can serve as the premises of a
deductive argument. Rather, the idea is that although X and Y both can contribute to our understanding of a particular
state of affairs, their contributions are unique.
5. Mental States. A mental state consists in content (i.e., its intentional objects; e.g., Brentano, 1995) and their
conscious apprehension. Thus seen, a mental state is the experienced outcome of sub-experiential (see below)
processes taking place (presumably) in the brain. Mental states give rise to the great variety of psychological
experiences familiar to both academic discourse and personal phenomenology (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, memories,
imagination, thoughts, inferences, and so forth).
6. Mind. Mind is the collection of sub-experiential processes required for having a mental state and the mental states
they enable.
7. Qualia. Qualia are individual instances of conscious experience. They are specific instances of the “what it is like”
character of mental states (i.e., the way it feels to have this pain, memory, desire, belief, perception, plan, image,
thought, etc.).
8. Scientific Precommitments. A presupposition that helps determine the formative background of the questions we ask
nature, rather than a fact or law we discover in virtue of the answers we receive. Precommitments are necessary for
and facilitate the performance of scientific inquiry, though they are not formally part of science (e.g., Rescher, 1984).
9. Sub-Experiential. Learned or inherited processes (and the content on which they act) that take place unconsciously.
Although subexperiential processes play a necessary role in enabling experience, they are not the experience itself.
An analogy may help: Although a play consists in a great many behind the scenes activities (securing funding,
finding a venue, casting calls, etc.), none of these activities is, strictly speaking, the play as experienced.
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mental phenomena are reducible to, or identical
with, physical phenomena: If physicalism is
correct, all mental states are substances that
have an entirely physical nature.
The most likely candidate for the physicality
of the mental is the body in which they are
presumed to reside. One part of the body—the
brain—seems disproportionately relevant. The
most popular physicalist approach to the mind is
psycho-neural identity theory (e.g., Place,
1956)—the idea that the mind is identical with
the physical-chemical states of the brain. As
Crane (1995) notes “there is no well-motivated
physicalist position which is not an identity
theory” (p. 22).3
But in what way does the brain effect an exclu-
sively physical realization of events attributed to
the workings of mind? Inspired by Turing’s anal-
ysis of computation (Turing, 1936)—that is, the
idea that a logical calculus can be implemented in
digital computing machine—neuroscientists (e.g.,
Anderson & Rosenfeld, 1988), cognitive psychol-
ogists (e.g., Marr, 1982), and philosophers of
mind (e.g., Putnam, 1960) have taken the position
that the brain is an organic version of Turing’s
machine, fashioned by natural selection to solve
problems by executing a series of logical opera-
tions. Although the mechanism of organic com-
putation is thought to be the processing of trains of
neuronal spikes, the exact manner in which this
enables thought and behavior still is not well-
understood (e.g., Piccinini & Scarantino, 2011). In
this way, mental states are reduced to physical
processes and the mind is seen as nothing above
and beyond the computational states of the brain.
Although the popularity of computationalism
has fluctuated over the years among philoso-
phers of mind (e.g., Piccinini, 2006), the idea
that neurons are the physical units that enable
the brain to perform computations (i.e., the neu-
ron doctrine) has remained a central tenet of
neuroscience (e.g., Gold & Stoljar, 1999). By
viewing mind as consisting wholly in neural
computation, physicalism situates the mind se-
curely within its purview.
Determinism and Free Will
If one accepts physicalism as an ontologi-
cally complete description of nature (as many
do; e.g., Papineau, 2001), then all effects are
physical effects and anything producing a phys-
ical effect must itself be physical. Accordingly,
what we take to be mental causation (e.g., free
will, intentions, decisions) is, in reality, nothing
other than the physical workings of neurons.
Qualitative, indeterministic notions of personal
agency are taken to be illusions that blind us to
the “fact” that every effect is a physical effect
and therefore fully determined by a physical
cause (e.g., Wegner, 2003).
In what may be the first systematic articula-
tion of a physicalist conception of causality,
Laplace (1825/2011) posed a thought experi-
ment (often referred to as his “demon argu-
ment”). Specifically, he held that if there existed
a magical being (the demon) who could know
(a) all the initial conditions (e.g., the participat-
ing particles of matter, their location, state of
motion and so forth), (b) all the physically rel-
evant laws governing their behavior and inter-
action, and who (c) possessed an intellect suf-
ficiently sophisticated to perform the proper
analyses, then the demon (d) could predict with
absolute certainty the future state of any system.
That is, if conditions a through c can be met,
and physicalism is true, nature is amenable to an
exhaustively deterministic rendering. No addi-
tional considerations need be taken into ac-
count: Free will and other forms of mental
3 Various well-known problems with identity theory (es-
pecially the multiple realizabitity of mental states; e.g.,
Kim, 1998) have opened the door to alternate conceptions of
physicalism as well as competing theories of mind. For
example, functionalism (e.g., Block, 1980)—which individ-
uates mental states in terms of their overall functional roles
and identifies token mental states in terms of whatever
realizes those roles (e.g., neural computation, silicon chips
or even rusty tin cans attached by string) in particular
cases—doesn’t require physicalism, but is compatible with
it. If some version of functionalism is right, this might be
thought to secure an important degree of autonomy for
psychological science with respect to brain science. If minds
are realized by but not reducible to brains, then psychology
operates at a higher level of generality than neuroscience,
and the findings of the latter can’t give full answers to the
questions posed by the former.
A detailed discussion of functionalism would move us far
from the points I wish to make. However, it is important to
note that although functionalism, if true, may be able to
solve the individuation problem in principle, it cannot (eas-
ily) do so in practice. The problem centers on the attempt to
individuate behaviors based on their functional role. As I
argue in section “Individuation based on properties extrinsic
to the enabling medium: A functional analysis,” it is unclear
how to identify which brain-based functions are high-level
(and thus amenable to psychological rather than biological
explanation) absent recourse to assertion, stipulation, and
the threat of tautology.
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agency are nothing more than tricks of the
mind, misleading us into believing that our vo-
litional concerns have traction in a world ruled
entirely by physical contingency.4
Subsequent developments in physics suggest
that Laplace’s demon argument, though still the
conceptual bedrock of most formulations of
physical determinism, is in need of fine-tuning
(e.g., Balaguer, 2010). For example, the precise
specification of the fate of any determinist pro-
cess depends in a highly sensitive manner on
exact knowledge of initial conditions of the
relevant set of subatomic particles (i.e., the fun-
damental constituents of matter). However, be-
cause, by the principle of quantum indetermi-
nacy (e.g., Heisenberg, 1958/1999), knowledge
of these conditions never can be obtained with
sufficient precision, the equations of motion
cannot be solved in an unambiguous manner.
Consequently, at the level of individual particle,
premise ‘a’ cannot be realized without allowing
margins of error in prediction. (Although calcu-
lating the fate of individual particles is, by the
laws of physics, indeterminable, quantum me-
chanics does enable precise prediction about the
distribution of large aggregates of particles;
e.g., Thompson, 2008. In this way, human be-
havior, which transpires at a macrolevel of re-
ality, might be seen capable of being accommo-
dated by deterministic principles— but, see
footnote 5).
Of course, the fact that one can explain a
person’s behavior in terms of nonmentalistic
particulars and their properties does not pre-
clude the possibility mentalistic explanation
also can have causal relevance (this sometimes
is referred to as the doctrine of compatibilism;
e.g., Nichols, 2008). Indeed, some have argued
that concerns about free will arising from mod-
ern neuroscience (which embraces the physical-
ist doctrine) are largely unwarranted (e.g.,
Roskies, 2006).
Compatibilism (of which there are several
versions), however, faces serious challenges.
For example, any attempt to endow mental
states with causal potency appears to violate a
fundamental tenet of science—the conservation
of energy (see section “Energy conservation and
free will”). According to this critique (some-
times referred to as the “argument from causal
closure under the physical”), for a physical en-
tity with purely physical properties to act on
other physical entities to alter their physical
properties, these entities must exchange energy.
But, because energy is a property of physical
entities (e.g., E  MC2), any exchange between
a nonphysical aspect of reality (e.g., an unre-
duced mental state) and the physical world (e.g.,
the brain) would result in a net increase in
energy in the universe, thus contravening the
principle of energy conservation (physicalists
do not face this problem in virtue of their iden-
tification of mental properties with physical
properties).
Physical determinism thus rules out any
causal relations between nonphysical and phys-
ical aspects of reality. Because unreduced,
agency-relevant mental states (e.g., volition,
free will, intention, decision) are seen as inca-
pable of interacting with physical reality, they
either are (a) dismissed as socially sanctioned
verbal conventions, recruited to help us cling to
our belief in free will (e.g., the illusion argu-
ment), or (b) if they exist apart from physical
substance (in some unknown manner), they do
so absent any causal potency (the epiphenome-
non argument).
The Unconscious Mind
If all is physical, then causality cannot be
explained by appeal to mental state constructs.
Terms such as judgment and free will are, at
best, epiphenomena (it is worth mention that
there is a sense in which the treatment of mental
construct terms as epiphenomena runs counter
to physicalist doctrine. This is because, if, say,
a “judgment” really occurs—even as a meager
epiphenomenon—it either is real, and physical-
ism fails, or it is a word that refers to what is
entirely physical, and then it isn’t causally in-
ert). This neutering of qualitative aspects of
mind fits comfortably with the modern view of
the brain as a neuro-computational device (see
section “Physicalism and Neural Computa-
tion”): Computers—whether consisting in sili-
con chips or neural networks—are physical de-
vices that manipulate symbols in the service of
some outcome which, of doctrinal necessity
(see section “Determinism and Free Will”), is
fully deterministic. Given these assumptions,
there is no need to consider even the possibility
4 Interestingly, it never is made clear by proponents of
physical determinism how the qualitative experience of an
illusion fits into a nonqualitative universe.
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of a role for mental aspects of reality in an
account of the mind and its operations.
Consistent with this perspective, psychologi-
cal scientists have taken an increasingly defla-
tionary view of the role of consciousness in
human behavior. Demonstrations that functions
traditionally assumed to be underwritten by
conscious mentation (e.g., memory, attitudes,
thinking, calculation, reading) can be performed
unconsciously have become commonplace. We
thus have unconscious memories, attitudes, be-
liefs, thoughts and so forth (for recent reviews
see Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010; Hassin, 2013).
The conclusion drawn is that much of what
formerly was attributed to the experiential as-
pects of mind can be fully accommodated by
subexperiential processes. Taken in conjunction
with the principles of physicalism, biological
determinism and causal closure (sections
“Physicalism and Neural Computation” and
“Determinism and Free Will”), unconscious
mentation calls into question what (if any)
causal role remains for consciousness in the
achievement of cognitive and behavioral out-
comes.
Another reason to question the casual effi-
cacy of consciousness comes from work by
Libet and his colleagues on volitional behavior
(for review see Libet, 1993). In a typical study,
a participant has EEG electrodes attached to his
or her scalp. S/he then is asked to perform some
simple motor activity (e.g., raise a finger) within
a particular time frame. The choice of exactly
when (within the time allotted) to initiate the act
is left to the participant’s discretion. S/he fur-
ther is instructed to disclose the moment s/he
first becomes conscious of a desire to act (e.g.,
by noting the position of a moving dot on an
oscilloscope timer). By comparing the partici-
pant’s conscious decision to initiate a behavior
(as indicated by the dot’s location on the timer)
with changes in his or her EEG signals, Libet
discovered that cortical activity commenced (on
average) several hundred milliseconds before
participants indicated awareness of their inten-
tion to act. In other words, a conscious decision
appeared to be reliably preceded by an uncon-
scious change in neural activity. Libet termed
this subexperiential change in cortical conduc-
tivity the “readiness potential” (Note: Although
this term most often is associated with Libet, it
actually antedates his writings by a few de-
cades).
These findings have numerous implications
for theories of mind. For present purposes, the
take-away message is that if subexperiential
processes (as identified by the readiness poten-
tial) are the true initiators of volitional menta-
tion (i.e., if the processes that eventuate in an
act commence prior to the conscious intention
to act), serious questions are raised about the
role of consciousness in volitional accounts of
behavior (a domain of inquiry traditionally con-
sidered a safe haven for advocates of the causal
potency of consciousness).
Contemporary psychological literature con-
tains numerous demonstrations of the alleged
sufficiency of unconscious mentation for con-
trol of thought and behavior. Because no syn-
opsis can do the topic justice, one more (albeit
highly influential) example will have to suffice.
Blindsight—the ability of people suffering cor-
tical blindness (resulting from lesions in the
striate cortex) to respond appropriately to visual
stimuli they cannot consciously “see” (e.g.,
Weiskrantz, 1997)—seems a clear case of a
function unequivocally psychological in nature
(perception) that is capable of being performed
in the absence of conscious mentation. For ex-
ample, in one study a patient was asked to
locate a visual stimulus presented on a screen.
Because s/he could not consciously detect the
presence of the stimulus, s/he was instructed to
“guess” its location. Research showed that
blindsight patients were able discern properties
(e.g., location, shape) of visually presented
stimuli at levels of accuracy (often substan-
tially) higher than would be expected from
chance alone.
The Question: Is There Still Room for
Psychology in the Science of Mind?
Mental construct terms are pervasive in psy-
chology: They are “part and parcel of the inter-
pretation of data whenever and wherever every-
day psychological phenomena are under
investigation” (e.g., Hutto, 2013, p. 30). How-
ever, if (a) physicalism is true, and (b) deter-
minism (instantiated by subexperiential neural
computation), accounts for all human acts, then
(c) an analysis of mind in terms of psycholog-
ical constructs is in danger of being superseded
by a purely biological rendering.
Anticipating (and perhaps fostering) the sen-
timents of contemporary cognitive and neuro-
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scientists, Minsky (1986) maintained that minds
simply are what brains do. But brains do lots of
things, many of which (e.g., digestion, balance,
respiration, hormonal regulation) do not fall
within the purview of psychological science.
Accordingly, the question arises “Is there a
principled way to individuate brain-based phe-
nomena that do and do not require psychologi-
cal explanation?”
In what follows, I attempt to show that such
individuation is more a matter of social conven-
tion and interdisciplinary turf wars than the
principled outcome taxonomic analysis or no-
mothetic necessity. I conclude that if one as-
cribes to the precommitments discussed in
section “Precommitments: Physicalism, Deter-
minism, the Unconscious”, a biological level of
explanation is both necessary and sufficient to
explain all brain-based behaviors—even those
traditionally considered the province of psycho-
logical analysis. And if explanation in terms of
psychological mechanisms and processes is left
with no work to do, there is no need for a
science of psychology.
Can We Individuate Psychological From
the Biological Activities of the Brain?
Before we can determine whether phenom-
ena assumed to require psychological explana-
tion can be individuated from phenomena for
which biological explanation is mandated we
first must have a clear idea of which phenomena
traditionally fall within the purview of psycho-
logical analysis. The American Psychological
Association (APA)—which can be taken as au-
thoritative on this topic—defines psychology as
“the scientific study of the behavior of individ-
uals and their mental processes” (adapted from
Gerrig & Zimbardo, 2002). Thus seen, psychol-
ogy is the study of the mind and its “presump-
tive” effects on behavior (Note: The APA does
not draw a distinction between “mental” and
“mind”; see Table 1. Although the definition
above refers to “mental processes,” in other
definitions these processes are attributed to
“mind”). I use the word “presumptive” because
the APA does not explicitly draw a causal link
between mind and behavior. However, I think it
reasonable to infer that the behaviors referred to
in their definition are those whose actualization
is in the interests of the mind, not those charged
with sustaining the biological integrity of the
organism (e.g., neural maintenance of hormonal
balance). Unfortunately, as the reader likely has
noted, the “line of demarcation” is not sharp.
For example, are eating behaviors (e.g., food
preferences, regulation of caloric intake) medi-
ated by the mind or do they serve the purposes
of homeostatic maintenance? There is, of
course, no reason why such behaviors cannot be
viewed as occupying that intersection on a Venn
diagram where the possibilities overlap. But this
simply adds to the problems facing attempts to
individuate the purely psychological from the
purely biological.
By definition, then, psychology is concerned
with behaviors that fall under the aegis of mind.
But the mind—which is nothing over and above
what the brain does (e.g., Minsky, 1986)—
consists in both experiential and subexperiential
processes (see Table 1). And if, as argued in
section “Precommitments: Physicalism, Deter-
minism, the Unconscious,” experiential reality
exists solely as an epiphenomenon, it has no
causal potency. Thus, all behavior attributable
to the mind (e.g., recollection, volition, beliefs,
plans) must result from computations per-
formed by subexperiential neural activity (the
neuron doctrine). But, because every brain-
based behavior—whether in the service of mind
(e.g., attempting to remember one’s past) or
bodily integrity (e.g., regulating glucose lev-
els)—is neurally enacted, what makes the for-
mer “psychological” and the latter “biological”?
Individuation based on properties intrinsic
to the enabling medium: A neuro-computa-
tional analysis. Short of finding some indi-
viduating signature in the neural substrate, the
apportioning of behavior-to-discipline seems
based largely on stipulation (rather than princi-
pled argument) in the service of justifying in-
terdisciplinary boundaries. Consider, as one ex-
ample, a brain function taken by most to fall
clearly within the purview of psychological sci-
ence—intelligence. As Bechtel and Wright’s
(2009) note, psychological explanation applies
to “any [emphasis added] attempt to understand
phenomena related to intelligent behavior” (p.
113). Although the concept of “intelligence” is
difficult to define (e.g., Neisser et al., 1996),
most agree that intelligent behaviors are cogni-
tively complex, goal-directed acts that enable an
individual to adapt effectively to environmental
contingencies (e.g., Sternberg & Salter, 1982).
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But, these criteria are too broad to enable
unambiguous classification. A purely homeo-
static behavior can be complex, goal-directed,
and facilitate adaptive responses to circum-
stance (see below). What sanctions the identifi-
cation of any particular behavior as intelligent
(and thus within the compass of psychological
science)? The (often unstated) assumption is
that intelligent acts are “high-level” functions of
the brain, and that psychology is concerned with
explaining high-level brain function (e.g., Vy-
gotsky, 1980). But now the circularity is in full
view: Behavior X is psychological in virtue of
being underwritten by high-level neural activ-
ity. But, behavior X is a high-level activity of
the brain in virtue of its psychological nature.
This approach to the assignment of behavior-to-
discipline thus begs the question by assuming
(i.e., high-level brain activity are psychological
phenomena) what it is trying to prove (i.e.,
psychological explanation targets high-level ac-
tivity of the brain).
There are, of course, ways to avoid this tau-
tology, but these solutions have their own prob-
lems. For example, designating a behavior as
intelligent often falls victim to species-
prejudices. Take, for example, the ability to
follow directions on a map. Most would classify
this as an obvious example of high-level psy-
chological behavior (indeed, a branch of psy-
chological science is devoted, in part, to its
investigation; e.g., Montello, 2005). In contrast,
navigation by sense of smell ranks rather low on
the human intelligence scale. But for other spe-
cies (e.g., canines), olfactory navigation re-
quires substantial neural complexity and adap-
tive sophistication (while viewing a map has no
obvious adaptive significance). Thus, for one
species, navigation by sense of smell would
seem an exemplar of high-level intelligence
while for another it is a primitive and inefficient
method to find one’s way. The level (and hence
intelligence) ascribed to olfactory navigation
varies by species.
If nominal designation (e.g., olfactory navi-
gation) cannot unequivocally position a behav-
ior on a “levels” hierarchy, perhaps assignment
might be accomplished by considering the
neuro-computational complexity required for an
act’s achievement. The ability to effectively
navigate potentially unfamiliar surroundings—
whether by smell or printed instruction—would
seem to involve a considerable degree of com-
plex computational resources. On this view,
map reading in humans and olfactory naviga-
tion in canines both would qualify as high-level,
intelligent behavior.
There are at least two problems with this
proposal. First, what is the metric that maps
complexity-of-computation to intelligence-of-
behavior? Compare a largely motoric behavior
(e.g., keeping one’s balance in a blizzard) with
a behavior clearly cognitive in nature (e.g.,
planning to cope with the effects of the storm).
Although the latter intuitively seems intelligent
(and thus computationally demanding—requir-
ing involvement of such things as imagination,
reasoning, planning and executing the acts they
encourage), the former also appears to make
considerable computational demands (e.g., ves-
tibular and kinesthetic feedback need to be con-
stantly monitored and updated; muscle groups
have to be activated, coordinated and respon-
sive to a largely unpredictable environment).
An index based solely on computational com-
plexity seems too general to allow specification
of behaviors attributable to intelligence.
Perhaps we can avoid this problem by focus-
ing not on computational complexity per se, but
rather on the particular kind of computational
complexity associated with brain structures that
enable intelligent acts. But herein lays a second
problem. To assess the computational complex-
ity (or any other intelligence-relevant property)
of a neural structure we need to know what
identifies that structure as an intelligent struc-
ture. And this is notoriously difficult (e.g., Jeri-
son, 1973). A number of proposals—for exam-
ple, volume of gray matter, cortical thickness,
neural efficiency, structural interconnectivity—
have been advanced, but each has sustained
serious criticism (for a partial review see Lud-
ers, Narr, Thompson, & Toga, 2009). Absent
scientific consensus on the neural bases of in-
telligence, it is difficult to assign behaviors a
place on a “level-of-function” scale based on
consideration of their enabling properties.
Another way to individuate intelligent (high-
level) from nonintelligent (low-level) behavior
might be to consider the range of problems to
which the behavior can be applied (e.g., Rozin,
1976). Viewed in terms of its phylogenetic his-
tory, any behavior initially is an adaptive spe-
cialization. Adaptive specialization refers to
evolution’s specific solution to a specific prob-
lem—that is, a behavior designed to deal with a
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narrowly circumscribed range of contingencies.
For example, while certain species of honey
bees have evolved the ability to communicate
the location of a food source to members of the
hive, this navigational competence cannot be
used for other purposes (e.g., von Frisch, 1967).
Rozin proposes that intelligence is the extent to
which a specialization initially developed for a
specific response to a specific set of circum-
stances has become accessible to other neural
systems, thereby increasing the scope and flex-
ibility of the organism’s ability to respond ef-
fectively to its environment.
Unfortunately, system-accessibility is not un-
ambiguously indicative of intelligence. Con-
tinuing with the example of olfaction, consider
the number of neural systems that have access
to the adaptive specialization that initially en-
abled dogs to identify an object by its smell—
for example, navigation, fertility awareness, as-
sessment of nutritional value. Yet, despite
availability to these and other systems, most
would argue that such olfactory-based behav-
iors seem more like basic biological competen-
cies than cognitively complex manifestations of
intelligence.
In summary, attempts to distinguish psycho-
logical from biological activity of the brain in
virtue of some neuro-structural property (e.g.,
computational complexity) are easily subject to
counterexample. In addition, many fall victim
to charges of tautology and post hoc stipulation.
Individuation based on properties extrin-
sic to the enabling medium: A functional
analysis. One problem with attempts to indi-
viduate behavior on the basis of underlying
mechanism is that all brain-based behavior
(whether regulative, motoric, or cognitive) is
assumed to depend on the same mechanism—
computation. And the way in which computa-
tion is realized in its neural medium still is too
poorly understood (e.g., Piccinini & Scarantino,
2011) to allow for unambiguous ascription of
behavior-to-discipline.
But many things can be individuated without
consideration of property or mechanism. For
example, although taxis and a hearses share
properties (doors, tires, chassis, mirrors) and
mechanism (internal combustion engine), no
one would confuse the former for the latter.
What makes one an acceptable mode of trans-
porting one’s date to the senior prom, and the
other morbidly inappropriate, is the function
they serve. That is, despite many intrinsic sim-
ilarities they have clear differences attributable
to external purpose.
Perhaps examination of a neural structure in
light of its purpose might help identify activities
of the brain that require psychological analysis.
For example, behaviors designed to facilitate
social function seem prime candidates for psy-
chological treatment (psychology is, after all, a
social science). Indeed, some have argued that
the major driving force in the evolution of psy-
chological mechanisms was the advantage such
neural sophistication afforded in meeting the
demands of the social environment (e.g., Hum-
phrey, 1976). Identifying behaviors possessing
clear social relevance and examining their neu-
ral enablers might provide a way of individuat-
ing systems of the brain tasked with psycholog-
ical functions from those with a purely
biological mission.
Although at first glance a functional analysis
seems promising, problems quickly arise. For
example, how does one classify a behavior as
social? Communicative acts such as speech,
grooming, and facial expressions seem clear
exemplars (e.g., Dunbar, 1998). But what about
behaviors designed to maintain physical coor-
dination? Incorrectly timed or awkward move-
ments can have a significant impact on the qual-
ity of a social exchange (imagine trying to
convey a positive first impression while you are
listing from side to side). Thus, while commu-
nicative and motoric acts both can have social
relevance, the former seem obvious candidates
for psychological explanation while for the lat-
ter a purely biological treatment seems more
fitting. Considerations of function seem to offer
no reliable route to individuation.
Summing Up
Regardless of whether investigative efforts
are trained on internal or external criteria, there
appears to be no clear-cut way to identify which
neural activities are best seen as psychological
and which are better classified as biological
(i.e., “the individuation problem”). And, given
the “authority of the biological” (section “Pre-
commitments: Physicalism, Determinism, the
Unconscious”), when faced with taxonomic un-
certainty the latter would seem the default po-
sition. The case can thus be made that the pre-
commitments of modern psychology have the
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unintended consequence of calling into question
whether psychological explanation is necessary
to understand the workings of the mind.
Questioning the Precommitments
The fact that attempts at individuation failed
to find a place for psychological explanation in
the treatment of mind does not mean that indi-
viduation is impossible. A strictly biological
treatment mind is sanctioned in large part by the
precommitments discussed in sections “Physi-
calism and Neural Computation,” “Determin-
ism and Free Will,” and “The Unconscious
Mind”. But, precommitments are not inviolable
laws: They are postulates that color how we
think about nature, rather than how nature itself
is constituted. As Rescher (1984) observes, they
are “a matter of the particular systematization of
knowledge we find it convenient [emphasis
added] to adopt” (p. 11).
Although not formally part of science, pre-
commitments are necessary for its conduct. Be-
cause phenomena do not speak for themselves,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to study any
subject without some precommitments to give
direction to how we think about and conceive of
the topics under consideration (e.g., Hanson,
1958). However, it is important to distinguish
the precommitments to which we ascribe from
those that are available. Precommitments that
guide scientific inquiry reflect “our conceptual
choices and interests, but [their] truth or falsity
is not simply determined by our conceptual
choices and our interests.” (Putnam, 1992, p.
59). The job of metascientific analysis is to
assess the legitimacy of our precommitments,
and, when indicated, emend or replace those
found to have less-than-solid footing.
In what follows, I undertake such an analysis.
A science of mind that embraces the doctrines
of causal closure and completeness of physical-
ism must assume that mind, being a physical
entity, obeys only the laws of physics. This has
the consequence of reducing the mental aspects
of mind to causally inert epiphenomena, open-
ing the door to a science of the mind in which
psychological explanation is superseded by a
wholly biological account.
In this section I argue that neither conceptual
nor empirical analyses offer clear support for
the precommitments that inform modern con-
ceptions of mind. In section “The Need to Make
Room for Mental Happenings in Our Inventory
of “What Is Real” and to Accord Them Causal
Potency,” I propose that attributing causal po-
tency to mental phenomena is (a) necessary to
understand human behavior and (b) offers a
basis for legitimizing psychological treatment
of the mind. I conclude that both psychological
and biological explanation are needed to under-
stand the mind.
Physicalism Revisited
Physicalism is a metaphysical position, not a
scientific fact. It is a presumption that helps
determine the formative background of the
questions we ask nature, rather than a fact we
discover in virtue of the answers we receive. Its
utility is thus stipulated, not demonstrated.
Modern science simultaneously is inclusive
and restrictive. It is inclusive in its belief that
everything falls within its theoretical jurisdic-
tion, but it restricts what it allows to qualify as
“everything.” Put another way, modern science
trades heavily on the assumptions that (a) those
aspects of reality, as we currently understand
them, are exhaustive of the whole and (b) the
laws and constants of physics are universal in
their domain of applicability (e.g., Papa-
Grimadli, 1998).
However, as Earle (1955) cautions, “We have
no way of surveying the whole of reality; we
have only a formal idea of it on one hand, and
an infinitesimally small assortment of unclear
objects on the other . . . we must in other words
hold our theory in precisely that tension which
represents our honest position; we don’t know
what the entire character of reality is, and we
should not attempt to close our ignorance
through impatience with the infinity of the ab-
solute itself” (p. 89). As discussed below, Ear-
le’s cautionary message receives strong support
from an ironic source—the laws and principles
of modern science.
Although scientists assume that their laws
and constants remain unchanged at all times and
in all places, contact with reality is, in fact,
limited to what we can observe locally (e.g.,
Wilczek, 1999). “To extend that knowledge re-
quires both an act of faith in the uniformity of
nature and a compromise with truth, for knowl-
edge has an inbuilt uncertainty to it [e.g.,
Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy]”
(Shallis, 1983, p. 32). To maintain that physi-
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calism (or any other monistic metaphysic) ex-
hausts the nature of reality is to substitute
dogma for demonstrable fact. Such a stance
forecloses what we allow to stand as reality by
presuming we have license to assert that reality,
in its fullness, can be captured by our current
concepts, methods and instruments of measure-
ment. To declare that the mind cannot exist
(except in a physicalist incarnation) is a meta-
physical conceit lying outside what can be epis-
temologically or operationally justified.
Physicalism asserts that mental events are
reducible to the activities of a material brain.
This view is endorsed by a majority of psychol-
ogists, neuroscientists, as well as (primarily
Western) philosophers of mind (for review and
discussion see Batthyany & Elitzur, 2006).
However, limits to our ability to measure—and
thus to what we can know (in the sense of true,
justified belief) about—reality constitute a seri-
ous drawback for advocates of the universal
applicability of a physicalist agenda.
Consider, for example, the “light cone” of
astrophysics—that is, the surface describing the
temporal evolution of a flash of light in space-
time. Events outside the boundaries of the cone
cannot (because of the finite speed of light) send
a signal that would have time to reach an ob-
server (living or mechanical) and influence it in
any way. A galaxy at a given distance from
earth is defined to lie within the observable
universe if the signals it emits can reach us at
some time in the future. However, because of
the universe’s continued expansion following
the Big Bang, there are galaxies whose signals
will never reach us. Because the galaxies within
the light cone likely represent only a tiny frac-
tion of the galaxies in the universe (e.g., Guth,
1997), there is a substantial portion of reality
permanently beyond our powers to know. It
therefore remains a live possibility that aspects
of the universe are forever barred from incor-
poration into our catalog of what is real. In
short, our understanding of the physical param-
eters of the universe is, by the laws of science,
potentially incomplete.
Turning from large-scale indeterminacies to
uncertainty occasioned by the very small,
Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle decrees
that nothing can be known about the properties
or behavior of entities that occupy minute (i.e.,
1013 cm) regions of space (e.g., Heisenberg,
1958/1999). For example, the Planck length is
the spatial interval within which the properties
of entities cannot be measured simultaneously
to an accuracy of greater than h/4 (i.e., p
q h/4), where h is the Planck constant, and
p and q are the measurement uncertainties
associated with the location and momentum of
an entity (Planck, 1925/1993).5
These restrictions on our ability to “know
reality” follow from the basic structure of rela-
tivity and quantum theory. Regardless of
whether they ultimately are shown to reflect
epistemological limitations on the scope of our
understanding, or ontological limitations stem-
ming from the nature of reality, they warrant the
conclusion that (at least at present) we have no
way to detect what transpires at great distances
from our earth-bound reference points or within
certain minute regions of space. This being the
case, it is logically impossible to know whether
phsysicalist doctrine has universal applicability.
In short, while they do not offer direct support
for the reality of the mental (but see sections
“An argument from the sensation,” “An argu-
ment from knowledge,” “An argument from
evolution,” and “An argument from meaning”),
these constraints on our ability to know impose
boundary conditions on all scientific inquiry.
There are other reasons to question the com-
pleteness of physicalist doctrine. First, the
scope of our ability to comprehend reality is
circumscribed by the limitations of our sensory
capacities and cognitive abilities (e.g., McGinn,
1991). Thus, there not only are limits on what
can be known imposed from without (i.e., the-
oretical constraints on what can be measured);
there also are limits from within (i.e., con-
straints on our powers to perceive and concep-
tualize). Second, our inability to situate a phe-
nomenon within a physicalist scheme does not
license its debarment from membership in “re-
ality.” Thousands of years ago, humans learned
to extract energy from matter (e.g., the discov-
ery of fire) despite lacking any plausible phys-
5 Although issues of quantum indeterminacy seem far
afield from human-scale events (but see section “Energy
conservation and free will”), quantum-level happenings can
have serious consequences at the macro-level. For example,
the activities the subatomic particles might, via a feed
forward sequence of causation, eventuate in feelings of
hatred which, in turn, result in a fist fight (or even a war
between nations). The message is that all phenomena, re-
gardless of physical dimension, are subject, in varying de-
grees, to the effects of quantum uncertainty.
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icalist account of how such a transformation
was accomplished. If a credible physical expla-
nation is a prerequisite for bestowing existence
on a phenomenon, the designation of fire as part
of reality would have had to await develop-
ments in chemical and physical theory taking
place in the 19th century.
In summary, theoretical, perceptual, and log-
ical considerations suggest that we cannot ob-
serve, much less know about, the behaviors,
dispositions and properties of reality falling
within (or, in the case of the light cone, outside)
the borders of these epistemological “black-
boxes.” In light of these considerations, it seems
that the ontological status of the mind is held
hostage to an unverifiable physicalist precom-
mitment. The assertion that mental phenomena
are subsumed by purely physical events cannot,
at present, either be proved or disproved.
This is not to say that physicalism is false, or
that mental aspects of reality always will remain
beyond its reach. A fully matured physics (see
Footnote 2) may be capable of explaining all
there is to explain (however, there are consid-
erations—such as the Gödelian incompleteness
of any formal system [see below]—that suggest
such an expectation is, in principle, unrealiz-
able; e.g., Strawson, 2006). But the important
caveat here is “fully matured.” Historical induc-
tion strongly suggests that adjustments to our
understanding of physical reality cannot be pre-
dicted with certainty—that is, we cannot know
the extent to which the future will resemble the
past, the unknown the known (e.g., the orderly
physics of Newtonian mechanics could not an-
ticipate, much less accommodate, the chaotic
behavior of quantum reality). Perhaps a “fin-
ished” physicalism will be capable of explain-
ing the mind without having to treat its subjec-
tive aspects as epiphenomenal detritus (e.g.,
Russell, 1921/1949). But we do not at present
know what a fully matured physics might con-
sist in. And, for a number of reasons (e.g.,
Spencer Brown, 1957) we never may. Accord-
ingly, tethering our understanding of mind to a
future version of physicalism requires we accept
a promissory note with no way of envisaging
the conditions of the note.
Of course, one might argue that although
metaphysical positions, such as physicalism,
cannot be directly confirmed or disconfirmed,
such positions receive indirect support from the
success of the kinds of inquiry with which they
are associated. The extraordinary achievements
of physics therefore might be taken as providing
sufficient reason to endorse a physicalist view
of mind.
But the authority of physicalism reaches only
as far as those aspects of reality for which it has
been fitted. And, as we have seen, inductions
and prognostications about experiential reality
based on the precommitments of modern psy-
chology are more a matter of stipulation than
the principled importation of discovered facts or
theoretical prescriptions (e.g., Klein, 2014a).
Accordingly, rejection of attempts to uncriti-
cally extend scientific methodology to the do-
main of experiential reality should not be taken
as a revolt against science. Rather, it should be
seen as a challenge to the assertion that knowl-
edge obtained by scientific methodology is “the
only kind of knowledge that existed or ever
could exist.” (Collingwood, 1946/2005, p. 134).
More, physicalist treatment renders the study
of experiential reality largely without a subject
matter—that is, mental phenomena are treated
either as epiphenomena or folk psychological
linguistic convention (a fate not befalling as-
pects of reality for which physicalism appears
canonical; for discussion see Footnote 8). In
short, despite its undeniable achievements, the
authority of physicalism must be questioned
when its applicability is extended to domains
significantly different from those to which its
accomplishments pertain.
Let me be very clear. I am not arguing we
therefore should endorse spiritualism, immate-
rialism or other nonphysicalist approaches to
mental phenomena. It may very well be the case
that a fully matured physicalism will fully ac-
commodate phenomena that, under its current
rendition, are seen as the epiphenomenal resi-
due of nature (but see Strawson, 2006). But we
have no way of knowing what such a reenvi-
sioning might consist in. And until we do, it is
unwise to tether our understanding of experien-
tial reality to a metaphysics that has the effect of
assigning the single most undeniable aspect of
our existence to a lower grade of being (e.g.,
Klein, 2015).
Determinism Revisited
The logic of physical determinism. As
noted in section “Determinism and Free Will,”
Laplace’s demon argument underpins most ver-
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sions of physical determinism. In this section I
hope to show that one of the premises of the
demon argument—that is, “we can know all the
physically relevant laws”—is, by Gödel’s in-
completeness theorem, demonstrably false.
First, from a practical standpoint we (cur-
rently) cannot formulate laws that enable pre-
cise prediction of future contingencies. Al-
though the equations of physics can calculate
the exact (or, more accurately, correct to many
decimal places) causal history of two interacting
objects, prediction becomes progressively more
approximate as the number of interacting ob-
jects increases (this is referred to as the “n-body
problem”). Whether dealing in classical or
quantum mechanics, the equations used to pre-
dict the interactions of more than two bodies
yield only approximate solutions (such predic-
tion often is based on analysis of a power series
that converges so slowly that getting its value to
any useful precision is impractical; for review
see Valtonen & Karttunen, 2006).
Although this might seem a temporary set-
back—one we can expect to be remedied by the
development of more computationally sophisti-
cated physical laws—there is a more fundamen-
tal concern that cannot be resolved by mathe-
matical refinement. According to Gödel’s
incompleteness theorem, one cannot supply
proofs for all the laws that capture all the truths
about any formal system from within that sys-
tem. In other words, for any given set of axi-
oms, there are true mathematical statements that
cannot be derived from the set itself. There
always will be statements about the system that
cannot be proved within the system—hence the
name “incompleteness theorem.”
Mathematical statements that are assumed
true, but cannot be proved within their system
of origin, can, according to Gödel’s logic, be
proved within larger systems which can be
shown to be valid forms of reasoning. Thus, one
always can seek a metaformalization to cap-
ture all of the “truths” of any closed system.
However, these larger systems also are subject
to the incompleteness theorem. Thus, the in-
completeness is iterated infinitely: Because of
infinite regress, certain laws assumed true
within a system of axioms cannot be proven
within any finite time. So, neither you, nor I, nor
Laplace’s demon can know with mathematical
certainty “all the laws.” And if that is the case,
then the deductive argument for determinism
falls victim to the falsity of one of its premises:
“If we know all the physically relevant laws.”
These considerations create serious problems
for determinism by making it impossible to
empirically verify its tenets. For example, to
demonstrate that a person’s actions are wholly
deterministic, one needs to show that precise
knowledge of the relevant initial conditions and
laws guarantees that a sufficiently sophisticated
being could predict exactly how she will be-
have. But such knowledge—in virtue of episte-
mological and mathematical limitations dis-
cussed above—is forever beyond our reach.
Although this does not necessarily entail that
determinism is false (or that free will is true), it
does mean that we have no way to validate
determinist accounts of human agency. Episte-
mologically, human behavior will always con-
tain an element of unpredictability. Whether
this uncertainty results from limitations in our
understanding or is intrinsic property of nature
is, and always will be, indeterminable. The up-
shot is that the possibility of free will remains a
live option (for a critique of Wegner’s argu-
ments against free will see Nahmias, 2002).
Energy conservation and free will. An oft
cited objection to free will is that its implemen-
tation would violate the law of energy conser-
vation (e.g., Ney, 2012). The physicalist version
of this critique begins with the assertion that a
physically existing entity with physical proper-
ties acts on other physical entities to alter their
physical properties. For one entity to influence
another, they must be capable of exchanging
energy. Because energy is a property of the
physical world, any exchange between a purely
mental event (e.g., an unreduced belief) and a
purely physical entity (e.g., raising one’s arm)
would result in a net increase in energy in the
universe, thereby disobeying a fundamental
laws of physics.
Objections based on energy conservation are
grounded in the assumption that all causal in-
teractions result in and from the exchange of
energy. This assumption, however, does not en-
joy universal agreement. For example, some
recent models of causality trade on the assump-
tion that what is exchanged between things in
interaction is not energy, but information (e.g.,
Fields, 2012). Accordingly, intentions, memo-
ries, perceptions, beliefs, and other mental
states can be granted causal potency if their
effects result in information rather energy being
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exchanged between interacting participants
(there is, to my knowledge, no generally ac-
cepted law of information conservation).
Imagine, for example, that a person decides
to write a letter to a friend. In this scenario, a
great deal more than energy is exchanged be-
tween cause (the writer) and effect (the target of
the missive)—for example, interpreting the
meaning the words are intended to convey.
Mental state concepts such as interpretation,
meaning, and intention refer to aspects of nature
that have causal potencies, albeit potencies that
are informational rather than energetic (for a
more analytic treatment, see section “An argu-
ment from meaning”).
Other problems with the energy conservation
position are worth brief mention. A number of
neuroscientists have proposed that interactions
between mind (construed in terms of its mental
properties) and the brain are localized in activity
taking place in regions falling below the mi-
crolimits of epistemological resolution (e.g.,
events occurring within the paracrystalline
structure of the presynaptic vesicular grid; for
review see Smith, 2003). If these ideas have
merit, the law of energy conservation no longer
has uncontested applicability in the realm of
things mental, because, by the principle of
quantum indeterminacy, activities taking place
in the microstructure would be unknowable. As
Meixner (2005) points out, there is little, if any,
empirical evidence for the applicability of con-
servation laws to the mind. Accordingly, the
universal applicability of such laws is an as-
sumption of the physical sciences—not, as often
presented, an empirically defensible result.
Recent years have seen a number of chal-
lenges to the principle of causal closure (the
interested reader is referred to Baker & Goetz,
2011). These critiques—taken in conjunction
with epistemological limits on our ability to
know about events occurring in very distant or
very small regions of space (see section “Phys-
icalism Revisited”)—suggest that, as currently
configured, arguments from closure do not
sanction any strong position with respect to the
mind’s causal potencies. Free will remains a
viable possibility (the question of whether men-
tal states are epiphenomena is treated more fully
in section “The Need to Make Room for Mental
Happenings in Our Inventory of “What Is Real”
and to Accord Them Causal Potency”).
The unconscious mind. Even die-hard
supporters of conscious causality recognize that
the mind consists in both mental states and their
subexperiential enablers (see Table 1). Accord-
ingly, demonstrating that an unconscious pro-
cesses can eventuate in a behavioral outcome
does preclude a role for consciousness in the
realization of that behavior. To think otherwise
is to engage in the fallacy of assuming that
because process X is necessary for function Y, it
also is sufficient. Although the performance of
any particular behavior is made possible (in
part) by unconscious aspects of the mind (e.g.,
neural computation), this does not, by itself,
rule out a role for conscious processes in the
behavior’s realization (e.g., Newell & Shanks,
2014).
Consider, for example, the phenomena of un-
conscious social priming (e.g., Bargh, Chen, &
Burrows, 1996). Unconscious social priming (a
favorite “proving ground” for those who cham-
pion the explanatory sufficiency of subexperi-
ential processes) refers to a participant’s perfor-
mance on tasks in which a stimulus—presented
in a manner falling outside the participant’s
awareness—subsequently is found to affect his
or her behavior in a manner that rationally can
be tied to information embodied in the stimulus.
Although such findings, if reliable (and there
currently are big questions in this regard; e.g.,
Klein, 2014b), suggest a role for subexperiential
process in performance of behavior, they do not
sanction the conclusion that consciousness
plays no part in its enactment (e.g., the claim
that “unconscious processes can carry out every
fundamental high–level function that conscious
processes can perform”; Hassin, 2013, p. 195).
I respectfully suggest that an insentient individ-
ual would face insurmountable difficulties ei-
ther in acquiring information presented in a
social priming study or displaying its effects on
his or her behavior.
In short, the most one can say about social
priming demonstrations of subexperiential fac-
tors in causation is that they are a necessary
condition for the performance of behavior.
Whether they are sufficient (as is implied by the
Hassin quote) is not presently determinable—
because an unconscious participant will be min-
imally responsive (at best) to his or her milieu
(for a recent critique of claims made by propo-
nents of the sufficiency of unconscious menta-
tion, see Hesselmann & Moors, 2015).
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Other challenges to the presumed irrelevance
of consciousness in performance of behavior
traditionally considered to require conscious
mediation target case findings such as those
reported by Libet. Here too, careful conceptual
analysis has shown that the implications of
these studies for conscious mentation are far
from clear (e.g., Banks & Isham, 2009). For
example, the claim that Libet studied spontane-
ously generated acts appears at odds with the
fact that participants were explicitly told to per-
form the “spontaneous” acts! And, although we
know that a readiness potential appears before a
participant’s avowed awareness of “intent to
behave,” what this potential is in readiness of is
based more on assertion than demonstration.
Perhaps, for example, it is in the service of
preparing the mind for a subsequent, con-
sciously mediated, decision on whether to act
(for discussion about the implications of Libet’s
findings for a volitionalist account of behavior,
see Robinson, 2012).
As noted in section “The Unconscious
Mind,” the phenomenon of blindsight has led
many in psychology and the neurosciences to
question whether our intuitions about the role
of consciousness in visually based behavior
need to be revisited. This concern, I believe,
is premature. Although discussion of concep-
tual issues attending interpretation of the
findings generated by blindsight patients
would take us far afield, I refer the reader to
Holt (2003) for an excellent treatment of
what, if anything, would require revision even
if it could be shown that performance of be-
haviorally relevant visual function can occur
absent conscious experience.
Summing Up
In this section I questioned the advisability of
a largely uncritical acceptance of the precom-
mitments of modern psychological science. I
concluded that (a) our precommitments are not
unequivocally sanctioned, and (b) by the laws
of physics, they are barred from attaining such
standing. Although they may eventually be
shown to be the best path to understanding how
the mind works, at present their applicability is
more a matter of assertion than nomothetic ne-
cessity. Accordingly, the epistemological door
is left ajar for the explanatory relevance of a
psychological treatment of mind.
The Need to Make Room for Mental
Happenings in Our Inventory of “What Is
Real” and to Accord Them Causal Potency
Thus far my approach has been largely neg-
ative—I presented evidence and argument
against the idea that mental states can be un-
ambiguously fitted to the physical-determinist
agenda and, in so doing, reduced to epiphenom-
ena. In this section, I take a positive approach—
arguing for inclusion of mental happenings in
our catalogue of causally efficacious aspects of
the mind.
According to the precommitments of modern
psychology, mental properties, if they exist, do
so as epiphenomena. Because, by stipulation, a
nonmaterial aspect of reality can have no causal
relations with the material world (the principle
of causal closure under the physical), mental
events are, by definitional fiat, stripped of any
capacity to interact with the world of physical
reality. In what follows, I argue that it makes
sense to accord ontological status and causal
potency to what is considered by many to be the
single most ubiquitous aspect of our exis-
tence—our subjective experience (e.g., Straw-
son, 2009).
General Considerations: Saving
the Phenomena
In moving to a sub-personal level of explanation we
are changing the subject matter, the target of explana-
tion. (Wong, 2014, p. 96)
Reality, in its most general sense, is taken to
mean everything that has being; that is, every-
thing that exists. Although subject to consider-
able discussion and emendation over the centu-
ries, Western science currently holds the view
that there is only one reality—physical reality.
But arguments for the inclusion of another re-
ality (mental reality) in addition to the physical
are beginning to undermine the existential he-
gemony of physicalist doctrine. For example,
Tulving and Szpunar (2012) maintain that “De-
spite doubts that some thinkers, through the
ages, have suffered privately or expressed pub-
lically, mental reality is as ‘real’ as physical
reality” (p. 257). The constituents of mental or
psychological reality include such things as
sights, sounds, thoughts, love, hate, jealousy,
images, memories, ambition, suffering, happi-
ness, beauty, ugliness, dreams, hopes, feelings,
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beliefs, doubts, wisdom, stupidity, the pull of
the past, the anticipation of the future—that is,
the processes and states that populate things
“mental.”
The relation between physical reality and
mental reality, as Tulving and Szpunar see it, is
complicated. “Although mental reality is utterly
dependent on physical reality, in the sense that
it could not exist in the absence of physical
reality, it also is independent of physical reality
in the sense that what exists in mental reality
does not exist in physical reality. . . . There are
no thoughts, images, memories . . . experiences,
dreams, feelings, hopes, fears . . . in physical
reality . . . there is neither personal past nor
personal future . . . there is no self.” They
continue, “The converse also is true, there is not
a single thing that exists in physical reality that
also exists in mental reality. There are no rivers
or mountains, tress or flowers, no brain, no
blood, no neurons or synapses, no molecules of
atoms in mental reality” (p. 258).
Although this may sound like substance du-
alism, the authors take strong objection to such
categorization. “Like all other cognitive neuro-
scientists we accept as axiomatic that mental
reality is fully dependent on the brain, is con-
tinuous with the brain the rest of physical real-
ity. The brain and the mind are made of the
‘same stuff.’ We do not yet know what that
‘stuff’ is but we have reason to believe that
eventually it will be discovered. Contrary to
what some people like to declare, we know that
the brain and mind are not identical. The brain
and the mind are different entities constituted of
the same basic ‘stuff’” (Tulving & Szpunar,
2012, p. 258). (This position could still be char-
acterized as a form of dualism, albeit a dualism
of property rather than substance). I fully en-
dorse these sentiments—that is, that mental
phenomena, though dependent (in some way)
on properties of the physical, are neither reduc-
ible to, nor fully explicable in terms of, purely
physicalist considerations.
In light of its assignment by scientific pre-
commitment to the realm of epiphenomena, it is
ironic that subjective experience is what makes
the pursuit of scientific knowledge possible.
Telescopes, microscopes, timing devices, nu-
clear accelerators, neuroimaging technology,
and the host of modern means of obtaining
objective knowledge about reality are useless
absent an experiencing subject to manipulate
these instruments, record their output, and in-
terpret its meaning (e.g., Dewey, 1958). As Gal-
lagher and Zahavi (2008) point out, “Science is
performed by somebody; it is a specific theo-
retical stance towards the world . . . scientific
objectivity is something we strive for but it rests
on the observations of individuals” (p. 41). To
believe otherwise has the absurd consequence
of rendering our knowledge of reality depen-
dent, in its entirety, on the provisions of an
experiential conduit stipulated to be causally
impotent or nonexistent.
As I hope to show, we must, of both practical
and theoretical necessity, make a place for psy-
chological reality in our inventory of “what is.”
We also need to accord it participatory status.
Our mental states are not passive, causally in-
effectual observers; they are active agents. Be-
low, I present several arguments for the treat-
ment of mental happenings as causally relevant
members of reality.
An argument from the sensation.
Discussing the limitations of a reductive analy-
sis designed to connect the level of neuro-
biological events with events at the level of
mental experience, Antoietti (2008) observes
the following:
While in the scientific study of physical realities it
makes sense to move from appearance [e.g., water] to
a “deeper” reality [e.g., the molecular structure of
water—H2O], where the mind is concerned it is not a
question of going to a deeper reality, because the
subjective appearance is the essence of the mind. . . .
Painfulness is not a contingent property of pain, pain-
fulness is the essence of pain; there is no appearance
beyond the pain itself; I feel pain, the sensation of the
pain is all I feel; it is a non-sense to say the [experience
of] pain is actually a neural process. (p. 52)
It is “a non-sense” because although we un-
derstand how the properties of water can be
connected to, and understood in terms of, the
properties and relations of their molecular con-
stituents, we cannot understand how the expe-
rience of pain can be derived from, or conceived
in terms, of the physical activity of neurons
(e.g., Robinson, 2008).
In fact, the experience of pain and our re-
sponse to that experience makes a case for the
causal potency of experiential reality. A person
placed under general anesthesia does not expe-
rience pain (else anesthesiologists would be out
of work), despite having his or her c-fibers fully
functional in the presence of pain inducing stim-
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uli (e.g., the physician’s scalpel). While the
effects of general anesthesia on central nervous
system (CNS) activity result in both uncon-
sciousness and lack of sensation, it is believed
that the unconscious state, rather than a deacti-
vation of CNS mechanisms devoted to process-
ing sensory stimuli, accounts for the absence of
pain during surgery. If this is the case (admit-
tedly, there is some uncertainty concerning how
general anesthesia achieves its analgesic effect;
e.g., Miller, Eriksson, Fleisher, Wiener-
Kronish, & Young, 2010), then conscious ex-
perience must play a causal role in pain-based
behaviors. No consciousness, no pain, and no
pain, no pain-relevant behavior (e.g., avoidance,
grimaces, screams).
An argument from knowledge. Another
argument for the need to accord mental states
a causal role comes from Jackson’s (1986)
famous thought experiment about Mary, who
is forced from birth to live in a black and
white room. To ease any feelings of isolation,
Mary is allowed to investigate the world via a
black and white monitor. Over time she be-
comes a brilliant scientist who has learned all
the physical information there is to know
about vision—for example, exactly which
wavelength combinations from a red tomato
reach the eye, how retinal information is
transferred via the optic nerve to the occipital
cortex, and so forth.
The question Jackson poses is “if Mary was
released from her black and white room would
there be anything left for her to know that she
had not already acquired via her exhaustive
knowledge of the physical science of vision?”
For Jackson the answer is “yes”: On release
Mary acquires knowledge that she did not pre-
viously possess—that is, knowledge of the qua-
lia associated with color (e.g., the redness of a
ripe tomato).6 These qualia previously had been
inaccessible to her because she had never expe-
rienced color herself.
But, if this is the case, then her previous
knowledge of color was incomplete. A person
who knows everything there is to know about
the science of color, but has never experienced
color, can describe the color experience in com-
plete, analytic detail. But she cannot know what
the subjective, qualitative experience of seeing
color feels like (e.g., Nagel, 1974) until she
actually sees color. And if Mary has learned
something new about the world (via her color
experience), then physicalist claims about com-
pleteness are subject to counterexample. If there
is more to reality than what can be captured by
the principles of physical science, physicalism
necessarily is false.
More, if Mary responds to her experience
of color (e.g., “Oh wow, so that’s what red
looks like!”), than her experience is having a
causal influence on her behavior. If that is the
case, than the epiphenomenal status attributed
to subjective experience also must be false
(after all, prior to her exposure to the ripe
tomato she already possessed every physical
fact about the color red). So, not only has a
new, qualitative fact entered her world, but
that fact enables a response unavailable to her
from her preexposure, purely descriptive
knowledge of color.
An argument from evolution. Physicalist
arguments in support of the epiphenomenal sta-
tus of “things mental” also are contraindicated
by principles from within the physical sciences
themselves. As many have noted, mental expe-
rience is the thing of which we can be most
certain (e.g., Klein, 2015). But how can a con-
stituent of mind attain the status of existential
certainty if its presence, by definition, is invis-
ible to natural selection (i.e., they are epiphe-
nomena)? Evolutionary processes cannot en-
gage with aspects of reality that have no
behavioral signature: There simply is nothing
on which natural selection can work.
The only scientifically sanctioned explana-
tion available to a proponent of epiphenomenal-
6 It is worth noting that Jackson subsequently rejected the
implications he initially drew from his “Mary” thought
experiment (e.g., Jackson, 2003). His concern was that to
know that Mary has a new experience, she must comment
on her experience. However, this means that Mary’s qualia
have caused her to comment. And because this contradicts
the attribution of epiphenomenal status to her mental states
(i.e., it involves a quale causing speech behavior), Mary’s
thought experiment presents a contradiction. Jackson con-
cludes, therefore, that there must be something wrong with
his thought experiment.
However, this “contradiction” follows only if one is com-
mitted, a priori, to the position that mental states are epi-
phenomenal. And, as I hope to have shown in section “The
Need to Make Room for Mental Happenings in Our Inven-
tory of “What Is Real” and to Accord Them Causal Po-
tency,” this is a highly questionable stance. Accordingly,
the contradiction may be due to Jackson’s pre-commitment
to epiphenomenalism rather than the internal logic of his
argument.
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ism of mental states is to argue that they are an
evolutionary by-product. But we know from
personal experience that mental states can be
complex (e.g., rational thought) as well as phe-
nomenologically preeminent. And because, as
Williams (1966) notes, complexity of mecha-
nism is a hallmark of adaptive specialization,
the by-product explanation is highly improba-
ble. Either we reject evolution, find another
explanation for how we have come to possess
complex mental states that are undetectable by,
and thus not subject to, the workings of natural
selection, or grant causal status to mental
events. I contend the third option makes the
most sense (particularly in light of previous
arguments offered in its support).
An argument from meaning. In an influ-
ential paper on determinism, Sloman (1974)
noted that mental causality cannot be simply
treated as a two-termed relation (X ¡ Y) be-
tween a physical antecedent (X) and its physical
consequence (Y). This is because meaning also
is a constituent of the relation between X and Y.
The argument goes as follows (see also Dewey,
1958).
If the physical acts of our bodies are fully
determined by physical causes, then there is no
place within the physical-determinist agenda for
such things as beliefs, intentions and meanings.
But, if this the case, then how does one know
how to respond when, for example, upon meet-
ing your friend John, he raises his arm and
forms a fist? The answer is that you know how
to respond by giving meaning to the physical
event (John’s clenched fist). That is, you use
your beliefs about John’s personality, memories
of his past behavior, knowledge of the present
context, and so forth, to determine your re-
sponse. Because you know that John is a kind
person and remember that he just got accepted
into the college of his choice, you understand
that his raised his fist as an act of celebration
rather than aggression, and respond appropri-
ately (e.g., you give him a pat on the back rather
than punch him in the face).
In short, mental phenomena supply meaning
to what, in purely physical terms, is ambiguous
behavior. On this view, mental causality is ac-
tually a three-termed relation in which one’s
“mode of interpretation” (M) provides meaning
to the physical antecedent (X) as well as direc-
tion to the action taken (Y). As Sloman notes,
the relation between mental and physical phe-
nomena “is not a two-termed one, but involves
a third term, a mode of interpretation . . . [and]
since different modes of interpretation may be
appropriate in different circumstances, there
need be no reliable inductive correlations be-
tween physical phenomena and [mental states]”
(Sloman, 1974, p. 293).
The key here, of course, is the introduction of
meaning into the causal equation. Absent inter-
pretation of what an antecedent event “is
about,” no informed or proportionate response
can be offered in consequence. But meaning is
not something easily identified solely in refer-
ence to states or properties of physical entities;
for example, Wittgenstein, 1953/2009). It is part
of the qualitative character of experience (e.g.,
Strawson, 2009). In this way, mental states
make a difference to how we interact with the
physical world.
Summing Up
Although each of the arguments presented
has its share of critics (there is a reason the
mind/body problem has been subject to intense
debate for thousands of years), taken together I
believe they make a solid case for according
causal potency to the mental aspects of the
mind. And if that is so, then mental construct
terms cannot legitimately be consigned to an
epiphenomenal existence.
Conclusion
In his discussion of the Enlightenment, Col-
lingwood (1946/2005) observes that philoso-
phers based their treatment of mental reality on
an analogy with established physical sciences.
Unfortunately, Enlightenment philosophers
failed to notice an important difference between
physical and mental aspects of nature—one that
calls into question the extent to which the anal-
ogy holds. As we learn about a physical objects
(via chemistry, physics, biology, etc.), we can
use these discoveries to better understand the
object’s nature and realize its potential (e.g., as
a raw material for manufactured goods, as a
source of energy, etc.). But growth in our
knowledge does not alter the object: “Nature
stays put, and is the same whether we under-
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stand it or not” (Collingwood, 1946/2005, p.
84).7
However, growth in our understanding of
mental reality changes the object of inquiry:
As the mind comes to better appreciate itself,
this knowledge transforms its way of being in
the world and its mode of operation (compare
the workings of the superstitious mind of
antiquity with those of the rational mind of
the Enlightenment). Mental states are not
merely knowable—the mind is capable of re-
flecting on that which it knows, thereby en-
riching the conscious mind and creating new
things for it to know.
Consequently, by accepting a false analogy
between knowledge of nature and knowledge
of mind, 18th century philosophers viewed
the mental happenings as though they were
just another part of physical nature, when in
reality they are importantly different (for ad-
ditional discussion see Klein, 2015). This dis-
analogy, I have argued, characterizes much of
contemporary approaches to experiential re-
ality.
The questionable commitment to a parallel-
ism between physical and mental aspects of
reality is underscored by the problem of sub-
jectivity. Within the limits of current under-
standing, there exists no viable, or even mod-
erately convincing, explanation of how
nonconscious physical matter gives rise to
subjective experience (e.g., Klein, 2014a;
McGinn, 2004; Robinson, 2008; Strawson,
2009). And, so long as concepts of neural
function have no explanatorily transparent
links with mental constructs, there will be no
conceptual bridge capable of spanning the
conceptual gap in our understanding of mind/
brain interaction. Accordingly, we must, of
both practical and theoretical necessity, re-
main open to the possibility that experiential
reality merits inclusion in our inventory of
“what is” and “what works.” And if this is the
case, then the mental construct terms will
have an explanatory relevance not fully sub-
sumable under a bio-physical level of expla-
nation.8,9
The alternative, fostered by the precommit-
ments of contemporary psychological sci-
ence, is to force reality—“all there is”—into a
(currently) unverifiable physicalist metaphys-
ics. If psychologists adopt this approach, we
expose psychological phenomena to a com-
plete makeover in terms of biological process
and mechanism: There simply will be no
room for a science of psychology. Although
my proposal (that mental states need to be
accorded explanatory relevance in our treat-
ment of mind) is not problem-free, it does
offer a logical, phenomenological, and empir-
ically defensible way to approach some of the
problems entailed by strictly physical-
deterministic approach to the mind.
Indeed, understanding nature requires we
accord subjectivity a causally efficacious role
7 The “stasis of the real” here refers to ontological sim-
ples (i.e., the basic constituents of nature). However, science
draws a distinction between ontological simples and the
processes in which they participate. Whereas at the level of
simples “nature stays put,” at the level of interaction be-
tween simples change is inevitable (though even here stasis
is pursued—the laws of science being attempts to freeze the
natural order into changeless formulae; e.g., Spencer
Brown, 1957).
8 This conclusion obviously runs counter to the position
taken by advocates of eliminative materialism (e.g.,
Churchland, 1981). According to this metaphysical posi-
tion, a fully matured neuroscience will have no need for
mental state constructs: Just as modern science has elimi-
nated many posits once considered real entities (e.g., aether,
vital forces, phlogiston), mental states will be discarded as
wholly lacking any correspondence to objective phenom-
ena.
A problem with this analogy, however, is that unlike
phlogiston and aether, with which we have no direct ac-
quaintance (they exist only as linguistic devices), subjective
experience is phenomenologically undeniable. Although
our beliefs about our mental states, and the terms we use to
label them, can (and have been) subject to intense debate
(e.g., Uttal, 2001), these beliefs (unlike those directed to-
ward, say, the aether) take as their object irrefutable, intro-
spectively-given states whose characteristics are made vis-
ible by the experience itself. More, the content of a mental
state need not be arbitrary, ambiguous or inexpressible:
Intra-subjective experience can be subjected to empirical
analysis, providing descriptions and conclusions that attain
inter-subjective consensus.
9 It might be objected that a great deal of psychological
science proceeds quite independently of any consider-
ation or effect of the scientific pre-commitments dis-
cussed herein. However, much of this work is demon-
stration- rather than theory-driven (e.g., Klein, 2014b).
Unless this facet of psychological inquiry wishes to be
subsumed under social anthropology (e.g., people do Y in
presence of condition Z), increased effort is needed to
relate observed effects to well-specified theories capable
of enabling parametrically precise predictions (not sim-
ply the binary outcome of “effect present/effect absent”).
Accordingly, as demonstration-driven psychological em-
piricism becomes a mature science it inevitably will
come into contact with the scientific pre-commitments
described herein (or their replacements).
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in our ontology (e.g., Klein, 2015). As Dewey
(1958, p. 13) observes, “recognition of sub-
jective minds having a special equipment of
psychological abilities is a necessary factor in
subjecting the energies of nature to use as
instrumentalities for ends.” Rather than sad-
dling experiential aspects of reality with epi-
phenomenal impotency, we are better served
by bestowing on subjectivity a full-fledged
participatory status in the natural order (e.g.,
Valera, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993). Training
our investigative efforts on the role played by
subjective processes in the workings of mind
enriches our understanding of reality in the
fullness with which it is given to experience.
I close with a quote from Dan Robinson
(2002) who, with his characteristic combina-
tion of precision, clarity, and insight, summa-
rizes in a three sentences what I have strug-
gled for pages to communicate: “What makes
it [the brain] interesting is its non-accidental
association with those events, states and pro-
cesses we refer to as psychological. Reduce
these, eliminate them, trivialize them, and, in
just that proportion, the brain sciences be-
come reduced. Psychologists have an impor-
tant service to perform vis a vis the Brain
Sciences; viz., supplying them with a psy-
chology worth having” (p. 11).
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learn more about the course and to access the video, visit http://www.apa.org/pubs/
authors/review-manuscript-ce-video.aspx.
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